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Adam Piette 
Beckett, Affect and the Face 
 
The production of affect in reading is riddled through with tiny inscrutabilities. 
Identification with strong feeling as represented in literary texts is explicable as one of 
the modes of expression of basic human sympathy. But the ‘as if’ clause necessary to 
fictional sympathy demands a complex set of conditions: you must internalise the affect 
as if the strong feelings were really taking place to someone close to you. This act of 
identification with textual affect is accepted as fictional and mediated (because more 
often than not focalized through a ‘remembering’ narrator, complicating the idea of the 
present). Furthermore, the affects generated by the act of sympathetic reading are 
governed by conventions both literary and cultural, not least those involved in the 
structuring of the affective event into quasi-dramatic situations with their own logic, 
power relations and fluid potential for projection, role play, allegorisation, the inviting of 
quick and provisional adoption of rival points of view. The invitation to entertain the 
possibility of another’s feeling in literary texts depends, too, on assurances of common 
feeling across time, culture and space – as it does on an acceptance of the premise that 
literary texts are indeed read this way, as invitations to feel. The premise implies a host of 
subsidiary half-truths: that literary reading is a post-romantic practice designed to gain 
access to the emotions of strangers; that feelings can be communicated through words 
alone if mediated by a sympathising narrator; that reading is a performance of those 
mediated stranger-feelings in the manipulable heart of the reader-respondent. All these 
conditions are put to severe test by the venom and malice of Beckett’s metafictions. His 
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narrators deny their own powers of sympathy; aim to kill off all feeling; seek to destroy 
communicable affect through a purging of language’s capacity to represent; lay bare the 
conventions controlling the eliciting of sympathy; desire to cripple all performances 
through an acid-bath dissolution of objects of desire, including all strangers, friends and 
foe.  
 The targetting of human sympathy is so remorseless in the prose and drama that 
readers are entitled to suspect there is more at work than deconstructive postmodern 
satire. Psychoanalytic interpretation in particular has fastened on the fictions as 
symptoms of Oedipal drives wreaking textual havoc, libidinal energies strangling 
maternal imago, mother tongues, all trace of renascent mother love. Beckett’s 
psychoanalysis with Bion in the 1930s has generated a powerful wing in Beckett 
criticism and theory. Didier Anzieu’s Beckett et le psychanalyste (Paris: Mentha, 1992) 
reads the prose works as textual defence systems against the maternal image, the fictions 
creating imaginary envelopes within which the ego dreams of recreating the common 
skin of mother and embryo only the better to tear it through. Evelyne Grossman and Yann 
Mével have been demonstrating, with compelling authority, the melancholia in the texts, 
the violence of the language a constant ripping away from the maternal.1 Affect, 
according to these psychoanalytic readings, is generated textually by the constantly 
painful revisiting of the maternal-in-language as both impossible dream of reunion and 
murderous violence targetting the mother Chose. The self-lacerating, self-hobbling 
textual mannerisms are both symptoms of, and strategic assaults upon, the prehistoric 
(m)Other within the subject. 
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 These readings rest on the assumption that the texts are theatres for the display of 
the symptoms of the melancholic struggle over representation of the imago in all its 
forms. As such, they seem to have narcissistic value only. The question then arises: what 
point is there to the display of symptoms beyond Beckett’s own psychobiography? If 
there is no point, then the affects generated by the texts in readers, if affects there are, 
become side-effects only, fake creatures of naive forms of readerly identification. If the 
affective charge of the texts is acknowledged to be more central than that, then one must 
accept that Beckett’s case study does have an abstract function as exemplary, moving 
beyond auto-analysis to exploration of the mind caught in the toils of libidinal forces 
within language – and is generalisable as such. But this move from the particular case to 
the general ‘species’ feeling is precisely what Beckett’s texts are overtly designed to 
countermand with the full broken energy of their comedy. To work as emotional texts, 
then, Beckett’s stories must have some hidden counterforce to the affect-denying 
ordinances of the severe comedic procedures and routines.  
 That counter-force stands and falls, I would argue, on the ground assumption that 
readerly sympathy as sentimental feeling with is capable of performing the affect 
triggered by half-conscious signals in the texts.2 To perform an affect is to simulate the 
rhythmical surges and tensed knots of conflicted feeling that might accompany an acting-
out of the words as touched or organised (even ‘secretly’) by the affect.3 With Beckett’s 
words, that simulation would depend also on a readerly capacity to perform blockages to 
feeling within textual acts of affect-censorship as themselves also organized by some 
muffled and ‘secret’ affect (not ‘deeper’, but more cryptically diffused). In particular, the 
blocked affect will be enacted through simulation in the form of baffled mystery, as 
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estranging enigma – the secretiveness a direct consequence of the white noise produced 
by the narrator’s screening effacements of all feeling. How Beckett’s prose invites 
readers to perform affect-as-enigma is the research question this paper addresses. 
  In Ill Seen Ill Said (1982), Beckett stages a confrontation between the 
remembering, self-analytical ‘drivelling scribe’ and the mental traces of the maternal 
imago in the shape of an ‘old so dying woman’.4 She is figured as an Eve-Venus in her 
last throes, mourning for her dead partner, awaiting the end, subject to rapt nostalgia. She 
is seen in her cabin and pastures over sixty-one paragraphs (Beckett numbered each 
paragraph in the drafts) fitfully attended by twelve mysterious 
watchers/mourners/guardians.5 The scribal narrator cannot control her image sufficiently 
to put an end to his own fiction – as if she were a memory trace, or as if she were alive 
and present to the mind’s eye.6 The fiction takes as its subject, then, the problem of 
imaginary identification with the mother within. At the same time, the narrative drive is 
towards extinguishing the affects normally associated with the plangencies of the dying 
mother. The narrator wields several weapons against sentimental feeling: dark cynicism, 
sexualization, clinical diction, dismissive fictionalizing, destructive energy, overt Oedipal 
tricks. This panoply of tactics is broadly comic, and is ranged with gusto against the 
narrator’s own project. But just as the narrator finds it impossible not to imagine the 
woman as maternally present, so does he find his own hunger for destruction of the 
imaginary world he has conjured into being impossible to bring to conclusion. Or rather, 
both the imagining desire and the decreative drive are subject to a third force, a power of 
intermittence in the object that gainsays both. The old woman’s intermittence is a rhythm 
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set up not only by her appearances and disappearances, but also by the tendency, when 
she does appear, to alternate wandering and freezing in petrified attitudes. 
 In an early draft of the French original, Mal vu mal dit, Beckett had scrawled one 
of his permutation sets, in this case the permutations between O, P and I. As published by 
Charles Krantz in his variorum edition of both English and French texts, these are 
identified as ‘pleurs’, ‘oeil’ and ‘intermittences’.7 In other words, one of the games being 
played by the narrator is to break down into pseudo-scientific blocks the mechanics of 
elegy: that is, the relations between the mourning imagination (the eye), the ritual act of 
mourning (the tears), and the uncontrollable absence-presence of the lost object (the dead 
mother’s intermittent image). Beckett’s representation of her ‘Intermittences’ is based, 
clearly, on Proust’ ‘Intermittences du coeur’, the section of Sodome et Gomorrhe on the 
narrator’s mourning for his grandmother – which Beckett thought was ‘perhaps the 
greatest passage that Proust ever wrote’.8 As Angela Moorjani has argued, the act of 
mourning in the ‘Intermittences’ section reenacts the death of the lost one but within the 
subject – the dead loved one inhabits the psyche as an alien presence/absence, acting 
almost as an artificial unconscious, the memory traces encrypted (following Torok and 
Abraham) as a living dead presence.9 Moorjani sees Proust’s ‘Intermittences du coeur’ 
exemplifying Melanie Klein’s idea, in her Love, Guilt and Reparation, that the artist, like 
the mourner, repeats the experiences of grief by re-performing both the loss of self 
caused by the destructive (m)other, and the loss of the (m)other inflicted by the 
destructive self (Moorjani, ‘A Cryptanalysis’, p. 877). It is this complex of fantasy death 
and fragmentation that Klein understands as leading to the guilt towards the loved/hated 
object and the consequent desire to make reparation.  
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 The narrator’s mourning for his grandmother revisits the lost (m)other in just this 
way, reenacting the death in dream form to play out the guilty secret of the destructive 
dialectic. For he had unconsciously desired her death because of his love for her, and her 
(postmortem) love for him inhabits him as his own death within – taking on the form of 
an uncanny ghost in the next room. The imagination then encrypts this knowledge within 
the text of the novel in enigmatic form: Moorjani cites one of the two dreams of the dead 
grandmother, where the narrator’s father talks of her tears beyond the grave. The dream 
ends with the cryptic words of the dream self: ‘cerfs, cerfs, Francis Jammes, 
fourchette’.10 These words are cryptonyms, for Moorjani, hinting at the secret affect 
governing the dream, in this case parricidal and matricidal impulses: the ‘cerfs’ repetition 
an allusion to Flaubert’s short story ‘La Légende de St Julien l’Hospitalier’ where the 
saint accidentally kills his parents whilst shooting deer thus fulfilling the stag’s prophecy; 
‘Francis Jammes’ because Jammes had begged Proust to excise the Montjouvain sadism 
scene in which Gilberte and her lesbian lover desecrate the memory of her father’s 
memory.11  
 The affect governing the nonsense is so censored and distorted, however, that it 
cannot be registered by the reader without this secret information. What is intuited is the 
enigma itself. Moorjani argues that the ‘Intermittences du coeur’ section is networked 
through the cryptonyms into relation with the Montjouvain episode and to Proust’s early 
story about matricidal fantasy, ‘Confessions d’une jeune fille’. But these allusions are 
only rendered available by arduous and disputable sleuthing, where decryption is likely to 
smother all affect. The elusive feeling of strangeness and bafflement that the narrator’s 
dream words summon have affective power as mysteries. The surrealist sequence of 
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deer-deer-Jammes-fork comes after the father’s reassurance about the grandmother’s 
tears of joy that he will write a book. The comedy of the sequence informs the affective 
charge, therefore: his mourning is being scrambled by nonsense. The affect, for the 
reader, resides in the narrator’s effort to tear himself away from the depth of feeling his 
grandmother’s tears summon in him. That tearing away is half-comic because it is also a 
sign of the mental confusion experienced as he awakes, the nonsense a rambling as the 
logic of the dream loses its hold on the mind. It is only once that first set of affects has 
been registered by the reader – a combination of feelings of bafflement, compassion for 
the depth of feeling occasioning the tearing away, and amusement at the verbal confusion 
– only when these mixed feelings are registered fully that the decrypting is motivated. 
The move to the deeper suppressed matricidal affect only takes place once affect as such 
has been experienced. And it is the feeling of mystery that is most significant here – but 
only, I repeat, because it has been experienced as so richly charged with readerly 
compassion and amused fellow-feeling.  
 As an example of this, the third puzzle in the sequence, ‘fourchette’, Moorjani 
argues, is there because it summons the involuntary memory episode of the fork striking 
the plate in the hotel, summoning memories of the halt of the train and the sound of 
workers striking the rails. But it is as likely to be a distorted allusion to Forcheville, agent 
of jealousy in the novel for Swann (and therefore example of all phantom lovers of the 
loved one for the narrator). Swann remembers at one point in A l’ombre des jeunes filles 
en fleurs when he had tried to read one of Odette’s letters to Forcheville through the 
envelope: ‘But the memory was not a pleasant one, and rather than allow the shame 
which he felt to deepen any further, he preferred to indulge in a little grimace at the 
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corner of his mouth, complemented if need be by a shaking of his head which signified: 
“Why should it affect me?”’.12 The instability and nonsensical chaos that the end of the 
narrator’s dream feels like with its ‘cerfs, cerfs, Francis Jammes, fourchette’ random 
series is a counterpart to Swann’s affect-avoidance. Swann’s grimace and shaking of the 
head denies affect but is a signal that the affect shame is operating and needs to be 
suppressed. Swann gives himself up to his face (‘préférait se livrer à’), thus surrenders to 
the surface of his skin, to the mobile features of his displayable ‘I’ as (un)feeling subject-
for-others (‘Qu’est-ce que ça peut me faire?’) in order to perform the dismissal of the 
unpleasant memory and its affective charge of shame.13 But the performance is a mixed 
one: it aims to be light-hearted (to smile and shake the head in amusement), but performs 
the stinging affect (the shake of the head signifying a fearful no, protesting too much, the 
smile become a grimace of pain).  
 So the intermittence of the lost other, one could say, is partly a consequence of 
inward affect-avoidance. The cryptonyms that are the sign of the affect are, on the face of 
it, just as much superficial signs of the affect being denied. Intermittence, as Proust 
understood it, is the heart’s unbearable swing from joy at the presence of the lost loved 
one to sudden alienating sense of loss according to the fractures and repressions of 
memory – a systole and diastole which beats its way down to an ending and forgetting. 
But the intermittence lies just as surely in the rhythm between full affect and affect 
denial, and in the obscure lines of force that structure their interrelation. With Beckett, 
the narrator concentrates solely on intermittence as ungovernable appearance and 
disappearance of the affective source; the bare mechanics of the swing from full presence 
to sudden absence is being deployed to efface the affects. And just as Swann prefers to 
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put on a brave face to weather the suppressing of the affect of shame yet signals his secret 
shame by so doing, so Beckett’s narrator in Ill Seen Ill Said desires to conquer all affect 
with his abstract metafictional view of the mechanics of elegy, yet displays affective 
symptoms at every move. Shame-facedly, it is the very act of witnessing the face of the 
other which most unnervingly displays this to the reader. 
 Ill Seen Ill Said proceeds as if by remorseless killing logic to seek out the 
immobilising of the subject in order to liquidate her material traces. In a parody of 
Proustian intermittence and its swing from memories of presence to recognition of the 
stillness of the dead loved one, the narrator’s paragraphs detail the old woman’s ordinary 
movements only the better to construct a petrifying resolution as her strength slowly dies 
away. The matricidal impulse, instead of being the hidden and encrypted secret as with 
Proust, is the overt norm. The intermittences which perform the absence-presence 
dialectic in Proust are the means whereby the sadistic affect is repressed. In Beckett, all is 
inverted: the sadistic impulse is the governing drive and is the means whereby affect as 
such is kept secret. The endgame in both Proust and Beckett is the same: the death of the 
subject as affective source. In Proust, intermittence itself becomes a routine and 
mechanical thing and the feeling of bereavement fades. In Beckett, we start with 
mechanical routine elegy: it is Proust’s endgame which interests him. 
 In Beckett, the desired matricidal resolution occurs most hopefully when the old 
woman sleeps – he watches her face (parodying the narrator’s gaze on Albertine’s 
sleeping form) for signs of death at this time of high vulnerability to the killing gaze: 
‘Dead still on her back evening and night [...] Alone! Face defenceless evening and night’ 
(ISIS, pp. 38-9). Her eyes closed, her face is without protection against the mind’s eye. 
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Yet the desire to put an end to her, to see her ‘dead still’, fatally immobile, is crossed by 
the affect it denies: the desire to see her simply persisting, still dead but also quietly there 
asleep nevertheless. And the killing gaze itself betrays this in its desire for her eyes: 
 
Quick the eyes. The moment they open. Suddenly they are there. Nothing having 
stirred. One is enough. One staring eye. Gaping pupil thinly nimbed with washen 
blue. No trace of humour. None any more. Unseeing. As if dazed by what seen 
behind the lids. The other plumbs its dark. Then opens in its turn. Dazed in its 
turn. (ISIS, p. 39) 
 
The desire to see the eye is outwardly a vampiric hunger to see if the mind is alive, the 
seeing a yearning for no life. The narratorial urge is to describe the eye and therefore 
extinguish any visible affect, all trace of feeling, life as feeling. Happy that there is ‘[n]o 
trace of humour’, there is still life though in the old woman’s dazedness – her inner 
vision is sign of persistence. At the same time, the wishful thinking is shadowed by its 
repressed affect – the desire for the eyes is crossed by a desire for her life: ‘Quick the 
eyes’.14 The sign of intermittence, the suddenness of presence after absence (‘Suddenly 
they are there’), signals the resurgence of affect in the narrator, an eye-for-an-eye return 
upon the self. His eyes too are dazed by the mystery of what she might be feeling. He too 
is the ‘other’ who plumbs the dark of the pupil, core of all facial affects. He cannot see 
what she feels, is as unseeing as her inwardly stricken eye. Everything he says of her eyes 
signals his own denied affect: the ‘gaping’ feeling for her dark interiority is ‘nimbed’ 
over the face of his text. Intermittence here is less a sequential swing from absence to 
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presence, than an ingrown intertexture of difference within the same words: the 
difference lying at the same faultline between bereaved affect and empty heartlessness. 
Part of the reason of the crossing of her eyes with his in Ill Seen Ill Said is due to the 
uncanny fact that he is mourning someone whom he remembers in mourning. Tracking 
down signs of her affects will always signify his own in this doubled elegiac situation. 
 The narrator manages finally to isolate her within her cabin; she is unable to move 
outside, and he scents the final days. The triumph would be the witnessing of her death 
and the extinguishing of her world. Like the toxic camera of Film (1965), the eye zooms 
in on her face, display-board of human affect,15 hunting for signs of dying: ‘the face yet 
again in the light of the last rays. No loss of pallor. None of cold’ (ISIS, p. 48). But 
instead of the desired tragic close, a mysterious smile: 
 
Impressive above all the corners imperceptibly upcurved. A smile? Is it possible? 
Ghost of an ancient smile smiled finally once and for all. Such ill seen half seen 
the mouth in the light of the last rays. Suddenly they leave her. Rather it leaves 
them. Off again to the dark. There to smile on. If smile is what it is. (ISIS, p. 49) 
 
Intertextual ambiguity streaks through the prose: if the upcurve is imperceptible, how is 
the smile seen? The shock at her humour (gainsaying the previous paragraph) as sign of 
persistent lively mind – ‘A smile? Is it possible?’ – betrays its opposite, a gladness at her 
gladness. The syntactical confusion (the ‘they’ of the rays revised by the ’it’ of light) 
points to an affective glitch, a turn upon the observing self, from the plural of the twelve 
watchers to the ‘it’ of his own eye. The glitch creates a tiny hesitation as to the anaphoric 
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reference of ‘Off again to the dark. There to smile on.’ The ‘it’ it could be that may be off 
to the dark to smile on – hinting at his secret joy that she smiles. What motivates the 
confusion, and generates the tiny semi-erased affects, is the Mona Lisa mystery of the 
smile. The face preserves the enigma of its interiority – s she smiling that the sun is at 
last leaving the world? Is she as glad as the eye that these may be the very last rays? Or is 
she smiling at some memory, triggered by the ritual return of the evening star? Does she 
smile at the vision of her own lost loved one – ‘Eyes closed does she see him?’ (ISIS, p. 
42). Is she smiling at all, or merely performing enigma through withdrawal from readable 
affect? The affect here is the enigma. 
 Emmanuel Levinas, in an essay written for Alan Montefiore, meditated on the 
strangeness of the face as site of phenomenological affect. For Levinas, the face of the 
other in its ‘nudity, destitution, without defence [...] is for me at one and the same time a 
temptation to kill and the “thou shalt not kill” by which I am accused or suspected.’16 
This double attitude summons the observer as ‘a concrete expression of mortality’ in that 
the face is so exposed to ‘the invisibility of death, to the mystery of death, to the never to 
be resolved alternative between Being and not Being’ (Levinas, ‘Beyond Intentionality’, 
p. 109). Yet it is not death which provides the face with its enigmatic force, but another 
alternative to the intermittence between being and non-being, an alternative ‘extending 
beyond the unknown’. That alternative demands a primordial response from the observer 
before subjectivity: ‘The face itself constitutes the fact that someone summons me and 
demands my presence’ (p. 109). It summons because of its very mystery, the enigma of 
otherness, ‘this ineffaceable strangeness of the other within my responsibility for [her]’.17 
The strangeness of the summoning face lies in the fact th t it ‘provokes my response or 
 13 
my responsibility, which [...] would be for-the-other’ (p. 111). Its enigmatic force, then, 
lies in its ‘questioning which, ipso facto, summons me’ (p. 113). And it is proximity 
(being face-to-face) that triggers questioning, the move beyond the being/non-being 
intermittence to a radical response to the call of human otherness. 
 Levinas’ phenomenology can be made more concrete by giving a specific content 
to the face of the other. Jean Laplanche sees the source of all enigma in the inscrutability 
of the parental face, or rather the ‘sexual messages that are unconscious for the adult and 
unmasterable by the child’.18 That originary enigma is compounded by the ‘enigma in 
mourning: what does the dead person want?’19 The enigma in mourning is sourced in ‘the 
otherness of the other; and the otherness of the other is [her] response to [her] 
unconscious, that is to say, to his otherness to [herself]’ (‘Time and the Other’, p. 257). 
What the dead revenant wants is necessarily an act of reconstruction of some imagined 
past, the other’s past, and the past of the observer and his own unconscious. Analysis of 
the enigmatic face of the other ‘goes back along the threads of the “other”’, for 
Laplanche, to  
 
the other thing of our unconscious, the other person who has implanted [her] 
messages, with, as horizon, the other thing in the other person, that is, the 
unconscious of the other, which makes those messages enigmatic. (‘Time and the 
Other’, p. 258) 
 
For Beckett, it is the mother’s face which is source of all enigmatic otherness, due to the 
inscrutability of her (erotic) interiority for the child – inscrutable, as Laplanche argues, 
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because the mother is (and was) unconscious of her own unconscious. It is the mother’s 
face, too, which is most powerfully enigmatic in mourning, the dying/dead face 
summoning a primordial response from the observer by means of her very strangeness, as 
Levinas shows. What fuses the two enigmas, the enigma of otherness with its enigmatic 
signifiers and the enigma of the face of mourning and its post-mortem questioning, is 
enigmatic otherness at radical endgame, the intertexture of the unconsciousnesses of both 
subject and object in elegiac proximity, face to face. 
 The narrator of Ill Seen Ill Said gains access at last to the immobilized face after 
the Mona Lisa paragraph, in paragraphs 48 and 49. Paragraph 48 revisits the mouth and 
finds no change in the smile, even though the eyes are now closed. Paragraph 49, after a 
journey away of ‘many winters’, again finds the smile unchanged, but still believes, on 
no evidence, that his absence from her has changed his own eye and scribe. In other 
words, if her face remains unchanged, there is hope of a change in the simple 
compositional fact that his own writerly apparatus is aging. So he resolves to set up a new 
form of controlled intermittence, a sequence of visits and absences which may bring 
about the end, ‘to finish with it all at last’ (ISIS, p. 51). Yet the very voicing of the need 
to depart triggers the affect being stage-managed: ‘But first see her again. [...] Just one 
parting look. Before all meet again. Then go. Barring impediment. Ah’ (ISIS, p. 51). The 
trace of Victorian sentimental ballad and Burns may be corrosively sarcastic, but the ‘Ah’ 
of recognition of her power to impede his own intermittence-machine speaks with the 
voice of enigma. As if to challenge and defy his intermittence scheme, in the next 
paragraph she is gone – ‘But see she suddenly no longer there’ (ISIS, p. 52). Whilst she is 
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away, he attempts to imagine her cabin to extinction: ‘[w]ell on the way to inexistence’ 
(ISIS, pp. 54).  
 At last in paragraphs 55-59, she is there, her face immobile, stony, near death. 
The apotheosis of the decreative drive is near conclusion, she is at last on her death’s bed: 
‘Alone the face remains. Of the rest beneath its covering no trace’ (ISIS, p. 55). The old 
woman hears a sudden sound, which seems to startle her, ‘the gaze the mind awake’. The 
observing eye closes in: ‘Far behind the eye the event recedes. When suddenly to the 
rescue it comes again.’ What the eye is seeking far behind her eye, the quest, is for the 
organizing affect ‘behind’ her face, deep in the darkness of the pupil.20 He wants to know 
what the dead woman wants. So though the memory of her dying face is being revisited 
with an anti-elegiac spirit of enquiry, the quest is still to seek out the dark ‘other thing’ of 
her unconscious affect. The sound of something collapsing in her house triggers the 
affect-response that ought to be traceable in her face, in the depths of her eye:  
 
far from the still agonizing eye a gleam of hope. By the grace of these modest 
beginnings. Within second sight the shack in ruins. To scrute together with the 
inscrutable face. All curiosity spent. (ISIS, p. 55) 
 
Deep behind her eye he intuits the affect of hope at the inner vision of her own house in 
ruins. And yet ambiguity unpicks the confidence of this reading of her: it is his own eye 
which hopes for the vision, the ‘second sight’ his own point of view, confused by the 
doubled elegiac situation. Like the coinherence of a reader’s affect with the performative 
display of affect in a text, the heart of the scribe is twinned to the affects imagined in the 
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face of its (m)other with quasi-illocutionary force. The performative fusion of the two 
unconscious affects, hers with his, constructed through the hopeful ‘together’, is belied, 
however, by the contradiction in the phrase as a whole: ‘[t]o scrute together with the 
inscrutable face’. His scrutiny is scripting the face with affect it cannot read into the face. 
What is being performed by the eye subject to the face under its gaze is not a perceived 
affect but unreadability of affect – inscrutability, not clear affect-signals.21  
 What the scribe reveals here is the lineaments of both his desire to destroy (‘the 
shack in ruins’) and the desire for the (m)other’s enigmatic otherness, the ‘event’ 
conjured by his questioning ‘quest’.22 The radical fusion of the observing eye and the old 
woman’s ‘[u]nspeakable globe’ (ISIS, p. 57) that occurs at this pitch may mean that what 
is collapsing is the difference between them. The returning eye may even be hers, a 
postmortem return to the final days. Or again, the difference between the destructive eye 
and her dying inscrutable face may be so radical as to represent the unspeakable 
difference between self and other, between self and unconscious. The intermittence she 
displays, her suddenness, expresses the unpredictable shifts and swings brought on by 
bearing those two inscrutable contradictions in mind.  
 And yet, as with Levinas’ move beyond the dialectical machine of intermittence, a 
third alternative exists, of her summoning him to respond, beyond the premises 
structuring his anti-elegiac routines. And as Laplanche argues, it is the enigmatic 
messages of the mother within collapsed into the enigma of mourning which is being 
performed on the display-board of the face. It is not affect which is being performed, 
however, but the inscrutable, unspeakable otherness far behind the eye, and yet 
mysteriously there on her surfaces, in and on her face, in the proximity of close-up, face-
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to-face. And it is that inscrutability which, paradoxically, is no longer a sign of the 
blocked affect which is so fitfully moving in the narrator’s own contradictions and 
intertextures. It signals, or performs, the source of all affect – the face that attends, 
closely, to the face of the other. Her inscrutability is what, in the end, he cannot say 
farewell to. The echoes of her face organize his speech, unconsciously, ineluctably, 
unspeakably:  
 
And what if the eye could not? No more tear itself away from the remains of 
trace. Of what was never. Quick say it suddenly can and farewell say say farewell. 
If only to the face. Of her tenacious trace. (ISIS, pp. 58-59) 
  
The face, because so destitute and defenceless, begins to demand human response, to 
generate, because of its inscrutable enigmatic force, performances of affect in the 
observer, as if it were the mother of all faces. Her trace is tenacious in the textures of his 
voicing of the tearing away, the obsessive return of the rhymes miming the obsessive 
return to her face. To write ‘farewell say say farewell’ is less a chiasmus than a broken, 
affect-driven imperative which gives the lie to its own decreative drive. The scribe is 
being forced by the face and its tenacious trace – through its inscrutability and the ethical 
responses these spark into being23 – to perform being summoned. The mother’s face to 
the mourning imagination is the site of the extraordinary fusion, not of two 
unconsciousnesses, but of the mother’s enigma as unconscious source of affect and the 
observer’s deep feeling as radical self-questioning shame and unspeakable bereavement. 
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 What Beckett’s late elegiac prose demonstrates is that the affects the face 
performs do have textual form in the relations between the compositional ‘I’-voice and 
the subject of the quest for the ‘other thing’ in the other. Those relations take place in the 
prose more forcefully in remembered and fictional form than in real present-time face-to-
face encounters – because bereavement is at once a conjuring of the dead face and a 
revisiting of the traces of affect still being generated by the encounter with the face as 
enigma-in-proximity. Affect performance is defined by such conjuring acts. The retrieval 
of forgotten affect through visionary encounter with the face is offered to the reader as 
textual trace – and acts as a performative of sorts, having the reader perform the affects 
generated by the same inscrutable face. The fictionalizing and the remembering lay bare 
the fusional and differential intertexture of the narrator/reader’s imagination with the 
affects generated by the summoning face. To grieve for the mother’s face is a plumbing 
of two darks, the dark of the observer’s own unconscious cloven into matricidal and 
loving affects, and the dark of the zone far behind her eye yet there in and on the face; the 
space of the (m)other enigma, source of all performances of narrational and readerly 
affects, yet in itself unspeakable, tenacious, inscrutable.  
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